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The Macroeconomics of 
Nebraska's Competitiveness 
world Agricultural Markets 
--Frank Zahn 
. In 
Nebraska faces a cyclical and a secular decline in its competitiveness in 
world agricultural markets. Economic instability and technological advances 
account for much of the decline, along with unfair trade practices and 
counterproductive government intervention. The short-term forecasts for the 
U.S. economy are fairly bright, but the farm economy, particularly in 
Nebraska, is gloomy. Because it is unlikely that government price and income 
supports will continue at current levels, Nebraska must take some bold steps 
to provide a healthier farm sector. Policy choices for state action include 
supporting federal policies that promote domestic and international economic 
stability, fair international trade, and the elimination of farm income 
supplements based on production; funding for research to determine 
Nebraska's areas of comparative advantage in farm products; implementing 
programs that expedite reallocation of resources to their most productive 
uses; and developing a state marketing strategy for each traded product that 
improves Nebraska's share in world markets. 
5 
Until a little over a decade ago, Nebraska's farmers 
thought they were insulated from the forces that shape 
the overall or macroeconomy. In the 1970s, it became 
clear that they were not insulated, and the connections, at 
first, seemed to be all for the good. Large quantities of 
Nebraska's farm products were being sold abroad, and 
farm incomes soared. 
Now, the euphoria has passed and the boom of the 
1970s is viewed as a short-lived cyclical upturn, rather 
than a sustainable acceleration in the growth of the farm 
economy. The upturn was followed by a cyclical 
downturn in the 1980s. The cyclical downturn, along with 
an underlying long-term or secular decline in the demand 
for Nebraska's farm exports, has created serious 
problems for farmers. Nebraskans recognized more 
clearly than ever before that the state's farm sector, 
which is a significant component of the country's farm 
sector, is quite sensitive to changes in the overall or 
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macroeconomic environment. As a result, the influence f 
U.S. macroeconomic policy must be carefully considered 
when analyzing the problems facing Nebraska's farmer: 
Farming in Nebraska is linked to the U.S. far~ 
sector, the U.S. macroeconomy, and the world economy 
Growth in international trade since World War II and th' 
emergence of well-developed international credit markete 
means that farming in Nebraska, along with the WhOls 
U.S. economy, is' an integral part of the world economy~ 
Moreover, now that the value of the U.S. dollar is 
allowed to fluctuate in international currency markets 
Nebraska's farmers are exposed more than ever to th~ 
uncertainties of changes in international economic 
condi tions. 
The current worldwide glut of farm products has a 
negative effect on all U.S. farm exports. NebraSka's 
economy is influenced more than other states because it 
is more dependent on export markets. Part of the glut is 
due to the expansion of farm production during the 19708. 
Much of the glut, however, is due to long-term or 
secular forces, particularly technological advances in 
agriculture. Both cyclical and secular factors have 
increased dramatically the quantity and quality of 
competitors that Nebraska's farmers must face in world 
markets. 
In this chapter, the macroeconomic forces that allow 
Nebraska's farmers to compete in world markets are 
discussed, and an assessment of their future prospects is 
presented. First, the scope and meaning of 
competitiveness in world markets is discussed. Then, the 
principal way by which U.S. macroeconomic policy 
influences the competitiveness of farmers on the supply 
and demand sides of world agricultural markets is 
explained. Next, the role of U.S. macroeconomic policy in 
the cyclical instability of the 1970s and 19805 is 
'l~croeconomics of Nebraska's Competitiveness 159 
ssessed. The factors that influenced the secular decline 
an competitiveness and the outlook for the U.S. economy 
Into the 1990s are discussed also. Finally, several 
:rnportant guidelines for economic policy and policy 
initiatives that can help improve the competitiveness of 
~ebraska's farmers in world markets are discussed. 
competitiveness in World Markets 
Conventional wisdom tells us that a country can 
benefit from making the products that it can produce 
more cheaply than other countries and trading them for 
products that other countries can produce more cheaply. 
Stated differently, if each country does what it does 
better than other countries and trades for what others do 
better, each country gets what it wants at the lowest unit 
cost possible. This is the principle of comparative 
advantage. 
Trade based on the principle of comparative 
advantage provides the most output of goods and services 
possible for each country, given its scarce supplies of 
labor, capital, and other resources. Natural resources, 
large domestic markets (which make it possible to 
realize economies of scale), human capital resources, 
and technological advances (the most important factor) 
have aided comparative advantage in the United States. 
Although technological advances may provide a 
country with comparative advantage for awhile, other 
countries soon learn to use the technology and the country 
loses its comparative advantage. Classic examples include 
Britain's loss of comparative advantage in textile 
production to Japan, the United States, and Western 
Europe during the 19th century. And, these countries are 
now losing comparative advantage to countries in Asia 
and Africa where labor is cheaper and more abundant. 
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The United States has gained and lost comparativ 
advantage in one product after another, includi e 
automobiles, textiles, steel, heavy electrical generati~ 
equipment, and transistors. Despite losses, the United 
States remains in the forefront of world trade. On 
reason for this is that the United States continues t~ 
adapt to changes in world trade conditions. Today, the 
United States is gaining in international trade of jet 
aircraft, computers, and other recently develoPed 
products. Although comparative advantage, once lost, can 
be reclaimed by reducing unit costs, in a dynamic world 
countries (as well as states or regions within countries) 
may lose comparative advantage permanently. 
U.S. farmers probably still have a comparative 
advantage in some agricultural products (corn, wheat, and 
soybeans). U.S. exports of agricultural products jumped 
sixfold from 1970 ($7.3 billion) to 1981 ($43.3 billion). 
Nebraska shared in this growth. By 1981, 30 percent of 
Nebraska's farm output was exported to other states and 
countries. Moreover, Nebraska's significance in total 
U.S. farm output expanded relative to other states. In 
1981, it ranked fifth among the states in cash sales 
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1985). 
However, since 1981, U.S. farm exports have fallen 
sharply, down 25 percent in 1985 from the peak of 1981, 
and down another 12 percent in 1986. (These estimates 
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (1985) are 
preliminary.) Nebraska has been one of the hardest hit 
states. These sharp declines s~ggest a loss of 
comparative advantage or that comparative advantage 
alone does not explain how much farmers are able to 
sell in world markets. 
A country has a competitive advantage, or is 
competitive, if it can sell its products in world markets. 
Comparative advantage, or comparatively lower costs of 
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production, is an important factor influencing a country'~ 
competitive advantage. However, other factors influencE 
it as well (Hushak, 1987). 
Factors such as market imperfections and 
rnacroeconomic policy can override cost considerations ir 
rnarkets, making it possible for a country to enjo) 
competitive advantage in product markets, that is, makin~ 
it possible to sell the products it produces, regardless oj 
comparative advantage. Guided by desires, such as self-
sufficiency, preservation of the family (small scale: 
farm, and nationalism, countries formulate and implemen 
policies in an attempt to improve their competitiVE 
advantage, even though they do not have a comparatiVE 
advantage. 
Some countries provide government subsidies and 
price support to keep high-cost producers in business 
others restrict imports with tariffs and quotas, while 
others attempt to lower the value of their currency t< 
make their exports more attractive in world markets. It 
these cases, gains in competitive advantage are generall~ 
short lived. Countries respond by formulating policie: 
that minimize the effects of another country's efforts t( 
manipulate competitive advantage, or they retaliate agains 
these unfair trade practices. 
Although comparative advantage remains the ideal 
basis for trade, it is only one factor that must b4 
considered in a comprehensive analysis of the competitiv4 
advantage or competitiveness of farmers. Other factor: 
also influence the willingness and ability of farmers tc 
produce and sell their products. Cost or supply sid4 
considerations determine a farmer's willingness tc 
produce and offer farm products for sale, whil4 
spending or demand side considerations determine j 
farmer's ability to sell. Both supply side and demanc 
side considerations are important in understanding th4 
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competitiveness of Nebraska's farmers in 
agricultural markets. 
Macroeconomic Policy 
world 
u.s. macroeconomic policy influences the supply and 
demand sides of agricultural markets and, thereby, the 
competitiveness of all U.S. farmers, including those in 
Nebraska (Gardner, 1981). Two basic types of 
macroeconomic policy exist: Monetary policy and fiscal 
policy. Monetary policy changes the rate of growth of 
money available for spending in the economy. It is 
controlled mainly by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System in Washington, DC. Fiscal policy 
alters total spending directly by changing the rate of 
growth of government spending in the economy or 
indirectly by changing the rate of growth of after-tax 
income available to consumers and businesses. It is 
controlled mainly by the U.S. Congress and the President. 
The primary domestic objective of these policies is to 
maintain total spending in the economy, which ensures 
full employment without adding to inflation. 
Even with the best of intentions, macroeconomic 
policies are often inappropriate, and spending grows 
either too little or too much. When total spending in the 
economy grows less than the nation's output of goods and 
services, inventories pile up, the inflation rate falls, and 
the economy experiences recession. Also, less spending 
reduces the demand for credit and nominal interest rates 
(those quoted in financial markets) fall. But, when total 
spending grows more than the nation's output of goods 
and services, the inflation rate rises and the economy 
recovers. At close to full employment, if the gap 
between the rates of growth of total spending and total 
output widens, the economy may experience a rising 
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'nflation rate and negligible growth in output of goods 
~nd services. Additional spending also increases the 
demand for credit, and nominal interest rates rise. 
Because macroeconomic policies influence nominal 
interest rates and the inflation rate, they also affect the 
difference between them, namely real (inflation-adjusted) 
interest rates: 
Real Interest Rates = Nominal Interest Rates - The Inflation Rate 
Table 1 shows the influences of U.S. monetary and 
fiscal policies on the inflation rate, nominal interest 
rates, and real interest rates. To finance an increase in 
spending or a decrease in taxes, the federal government 
must borrow money in financial markets. This increased 
demand for credit places upward pressure on nominal 
interest rates. When the federal government spends what 
it borrows or when taxpayers spend their additional 
after-tax income on goods and services, upward pressure 
is placed on the inflation rate. Higher nominal interest 
rates raise real interest rates, while a higher inflation 
rate reduces real interest rates. The influences tend to 
Table 1 - Direction of impact of U.S. macroeconomic 
policies on interest rates and inflation 
Item Fiscal policy Monetary 
Nominal interest rates r 1 
Minus 
Infla tion rate r r 
Equals 
Real interest rates r (?) 1 
policy 
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be offsetting and the net effect is ambiguous. It depend 
on which of the two, the interest rate effect or th S 
inflation rate effect, dominates. Given that the quanti; 
of money in the economy does not change, it is likely 
that the interest rate effect dominates, and expansionary 
fiscal policy raises real interest rates. Of course, the 
effects of contractionary fiscal policy, that is, less 
government spending or increased taxes, produces the 
opposite result. 
When the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, the nation's monetary authority 
increases the quantity of money in the economy: 
downward pressure is placed on nominal interest rates. 
More of any asset in the economy generally implies that 
the price for its use falls. As the new money is spent 
on goods and services, upward pressure is placed on the 
inflation rate. Expansionary monetary policy lowers 
nominal interest rates and raises the inflation rate, and 
each of these changes reduces real interest rates. Of 
course, contractionary monetary policy, which reduces the 
nation's money supply, produces the opposite effect. 
The Link with Interest Rates 
Real interest rates transmit changes in macro-
economic policy to the supply and demand sides of the 
U.S. agricultural markets (figure 1). Real interest rates 
influence the supply of farm products directly by 
changing costs of production and the demand for farm 
products by changing exchange rates. In turn, the supply 
of and demand for farm products determine farm prices 
and sales or earned income. 
A flexible exchange rate system allows changes in 
real interest rates to affect the demand for farm 
products (Hakkio, 1986). When real interest rates in the 
economics of Nebraska's Competitiveness 
/!IBCro 
Figure 1 
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United States change relative to those in other COuntr' Ies 
they affect exchange rates and export demand. p' 
example, when real interest rates in the United Stator 
increase, U.S. financial assets become relatively moes 
profit~ble than those of other countries. People in oth:; 
countnes then demand more U.S. dollars to buy mor 
U.S. financial assets. In turn, the increased demand foe 
U.S. dollars raises the value of the dollar relative / 
other currendes in international currency marketsO 
However, a more expensive dollar reduces forei~ 
demand for U.S. products, including farm products (U.S. 
exports), and increases domestic demand for foreign 
products (U.S. imports). Hence, higher real interest 
rates lead to a higher exchange value for the U.S. dollar 
, 
and U.S. farm products become more expensive or less 
competitive in world markets. 
Changes in real interest rates affect the supply of 
f arm products by changing costs of production. An 
increase in interest rates, for example, raises the cost 
of credit to finance purchases of new capital; to carry 
inventories; to finance purchases of inputs, such as 
feeder livestock, seeds, fuel, and fertilizer; and to 
service variable-interest debt. Just as higher real 
interest rates increase the value of the dollar and make 
U.S. farm products less competitive through the demand 
side of world markets, they increase production costs 
and make farm products more expensive or less 
competitive through the supply side of world markets. 
Changes in the supply of and demand for U.S. farm 
products, brought on by policies that influence real 
interest rates, alter U.S. farm prices. Moreover, because 
farm prices are more flexible than other prices, they 
adjust more quickly to economic change. Consequently, 
when monetary and fiscal policies either stimulate or 
reduce total spending in the economy, farm prices change 
(oeconomics of Nebraska's Competitiveness 
lIse 
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re quickly than other prices at home and abroad ~;rankel, 1984). In free markets, this means that when 
f fin prices rise, farmers produce more than they will 
a. able to sell in world markets when prices again 
b:a.bilize. Conversely, when prices fall, farmers produce 
~ sS than they will be able to sell in world markets 
:hen prices again stabilize. This overshooting of farm 
Idces lends credibility to the argument that formulation 
~f U.S. macroeconomic policy should take into account 
the disproportionate effects of policy on the farm sector 
in the short-term. 
Cyclical Rise and Decline in Competitiveness 
The markets for farm products were relatively 
stable during the 1950s and the 1960s. U.S. government 
regulation of credit markets and macroeconomic policy 
promoted relatively low and stable real interest rates 
which stabilized costs of production on the supply side of 
agricultural markets. Moreover, U.S. monetary policy 
maintained fixed exchange rates on the U.S. dollar so 
that, along with an income-insensitive domestic demand 
for farm products, there was stable growth in the 
demand for farm products. Beyond the underlying 
stability created by a relatively stable macroeconomic 
environment, government price supports ensured that 
prices of farm products would not fall to unreasonable 
levels in case of unexpected changes in either the demand 
or supply sides of agricultural markets. 
The stability of the 1950s and early 1960s soon gave 
way to the boom and bust years of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Clearly, changes in macroeconomic policy during this 
period had an important influence on real interest rates, 
which seriously impaired the competitiveness of U.S. 
producers, including Nebraska farmers, in world 
168 Frank Z 
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markets. The effect of changes in the mix of monetary 
and fiscal policies on variables critical to the 
competitiveness of farmers during the 1970s and 1980 
s is 
summarized in table 2. 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, total spending in th 
economy grew relative to the nation's output of gOOds an~ 
services. There was rapid growth in private secto 
spending, as well as government spending. More an~ 
more government spending was directed toward winning 
the Vietnam War and solving the country's social 
problems. This growth in spending was supported by the 
Federal Reserve pumping more money into the economy. 
The easy fiscal policy, combined with the easy monetary 
policy in the late 1960s and 1970s showed that When the 
desire to spend grows relative to the ability to produce 
the inflation rate rises. 
Table 2 - The direction and impact of U.S. macroeconomic policy on real 
interest rates for several time periods 
Item Early 1970s' 
Late 1970s 2 
to early 1980s Since 1985~ 
Nominal interest rates (Small) i (Large) i 1 
Minus 
Inflation rate (Large) i (Large) 1 ~4 
Equals 
1 1 Real interest rates i 
Exchange rates 4 1 1 i 
'This period was characterized by easy fiscal policies and easy monetary 
policies. 
2This period was characterized by easy fiscal policies and tight monetary 
policies. 
3This period was characterized by tighter fiscal policies and easier monetary 
policies. 
4Foreign currency price of U.S. dollars. 
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Other factors also helped to increase prices of farm 
oducts. In the early 1970s, several short crops 
pferseas drove down world stocks of farm products. ~~oreover, income growth in developing (Third World) 
. untries increased the demand for food. These factors ~~a.rnaticallY increased U.S. farm export demand, and 
rices of farm products soared. 
P In the 1970s, nominal interest rates did not adjust 
sufficiently to offset the rising inflation rate. As a 
result, real interest rates fell (figure 2). With low and 
even negative actual real interest rates in the United 
Sta.tes, the demand for higher yielding foreign assets 
increased. The shift from U.S. dollars to other 
currencies put downward pressure on the exchange value 
of the dollar in international currency markets. The 
FIGURE 2 
Real Prime Interest Rate, United States, 1970-86 
1O~------------------------------------------~ 
8 
6 
o 1-----~~~--~~~~~------------------__; 
-2 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 
YEAR 
Source: Wharton Econometrics data base. 
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pressure was so substantial that the United Stat 
abandoned the fixed exchange rate system and let ~s 
dollar float against other currencies. As a result the 
value of the dollar declined substantially during the i97Q e 
(figure 3). This action ushered in the flexible exchang S 
rate system which evolved in the mid-1970s. The syste~ 
was expected to permit internal macroeconomic p<>lic 
independent of fluctuations in the exchange rate. On thY 
downside, however, flexible exchange rates provided th: 
vehicle whereby U.S. producers, including farmers, Were 
exposed to the uncertainties of changes in world market 
conditions. 
As the value of the dollar fell during the 1970s, the 
purchasing power of foreign currencies rose and other 
countries demanded more U.S. products, including 
Nebraska farm products. Abundant credit, available at 
150 
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FIGURE 3 
Federal Reserve Trade Weighted Exchange Rate 
for the U.S. Dollar, 1970-86 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 
YEAR 
Source: Wharton Econometrics data base. 
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1 w real interest rates, promoted growth in exports to ~hird World countries as well. The increase in farm 
xport demand resulted in upward pressure on farm 
e~ices, and farmers responded with substantial increases 
Pn farm production. In fact, prices of farm products 
Increased relatively more than prices of other products 
I . during most of the 1970s, that 1S, the terms of trade 
between farmers and other domestic producers in the 
I economy changed in favor of the farmer (figure 4). The 
increased demand for farm products and the general 
i )Ucrease in demand for real assets, which serve as 
hedges against inflation, increased the demand for farm 
assets, particularly farmland. Rising farm equity served 
as collateral for additional credit, which farmers used to 
finance capital investment and increase production. 
FIGURE 4 
U.s. Farm and Non-Farm Prices, 1970-86 
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The increased demand for farm products in til 
early 1970s brought prosperity to the agricultural secto e 
but prosperity soon gave way to despair for rn~' 
farmers in the 1980s. Although the trend of nominal n~ 
farm income, including government payments, has been 
relatively flat since the late 1970s (figure 5), its 
dramatic increase between 1970 and 1973 set off a 
period of farmland speculation. Rising land prices during 
the 1970s and rising interest rates during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s meant that farmers needed more cash to 
meet their financial obligations. The growth in farm 
debt, particularly debt on farmland, and the failure of 
net cash income to grow as it had during the early 1970s 
strained the ability of some farmers to service their 
debt and continue operating. 
FIGURE 5 
Nominal and Real U.S. Net Farm Income, 1970-86 
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The prosperity of the 1960s and the early 1970s in 
the United States was the result of easy fiscal and 
monetary policies. Substantial growth in total spending 
relative to total production resulted in double digit 
inflation. The Unit~d States was on a spending spree. 
"Spend to Prospenty" was one of the slogans of the 
times. 
Although easy fiscal policy continued into the late 
1970s, the Federal Reserve initiated a major change in 
monetary policy to curb inflation. The Federal Reserve 
brought growth in spending in line with growth in the 
economy's output by reducing growth in the money supply. 
As a result, in the early 1980s the inflation rate fell and 
real interest rates rose (figure 2). In turn, higher real 
interest rates increased the value of the U.S. dollar 
(figure 3). 
The more expensive U.S. dollar reduced export 
demand. In addition, rising interest rates increased the 
debt service payments of Third World countries, the 
principal growth markets for farm exports. Therefore, 
export demand declined further. The decline in export 
demand reduced farm prices, and, once again, farm 
prices in the 1980s were more responsive than other 
prices to changes in macroeconomic policy, this time on 
the downside, that is, the terms of trade turned against 
the farmer (figure 4). 
Farmers lost more than other domestic producers as 
a result of the correction for inflation. In free markets, 
prices and quantities supplied would have decreased 
enough to balance supplies and demands for farm 
I products. However, government price supports prevented 
. much of the adjustment in the 1980s. The result has been 
overproduction of farm products. 
Because of the decline in inflation during the early 
1980s, the Federal Reserve has eased monetary policy 
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since 1985. Monetary ease and tighter fiscal pOlicy 
influenced by the spirit, if not the letter, of the Gramm' 
Rudman, Hollings Bill, have reduced real interest rate~ 
(figure 2) and the value of the dollar (figure 3). 
The drop in the value of the dollar, measured by the 
Federal Reserve's general trade weighted index, has 
increased U.S. export demand. However, a rapid 
expansion in the export demand for farm products is not 
expected. A long lag is a contributing factor, but more 
importantly, currencies of major U.S. competitors in 
world agricultural markets (for example, Canada 
Argentina, and Australia) have depreciated further agains~ 
the dollar, making these countries more competitive in 
world markets. In addition, Third World countries, the 
segment of the world food market with the most 
potential for growth, remain bogged down with debt 
repayment problems. So, these countries will not be able 
to substantially increase purchases of U.S. farm products 
in the near future. Moreover, long-term or secular 
forces (discussed in the next section) are working to 
reduce the growth in U.S. export demand for farm 
products. 
On the supply side of agricultural markets, U.S. 
farm output continues to increase as farmers continue to 
respond to government program incentives rather than 
market signals. Farmers receive government support 
payment based on their production. The more you 
produce, the more you get. As a result, overproduction 
persists. 
Ample farm stocks have led to declining farm prices 
(figure 4) and decreases in net farm income (excluding 
government payments) in both nominal and real terms. 
Government payments have continued, however, to 
maintain the trend in nominal net farm income (including 
government payments) since the late 1970s (figure 5). 
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Government payments to farmers accounted for 42 
ercent of total U.S. net income during 1986. Payments 
Po Nebraska's farmers accounted for about 56 percent of ~ebraska's net farm income (U.S. Department of 
:Agriculture, 1985). 
Secular Decline in Competitiveness 
Growth in productivity implies lower costs of 
production, which permits gains in competitiveness 
through gains in comparative advantage. Growth in U.S. 
agricultural productivity during the 19th century was 
based on bringing fertile land into production and 
favorable climatic conditions. These factors are still 
important, but they account for only part of the 
spectacular growth in agricultural productivity. While 
farm output has tripled, labor requirements have fallen 
by 80 percent and land area in production has changed 
very little (Nebraska Department of Economic 
Development, 1987). The principal sources of growth in 
productivity have been technological advances, education, 
and capital investment. Biotechnology may ultimately add 
more to farming productivity than any other development. 
It has the potential for increasing productivity at rates 
that are higher than those of the past two centuries 
(Avery, 1985). 
Recently, however, several factors have contributed 
to a secular or long-term decline in the U.S. farmer's 
competitiveness in world markets. The most important 
factor is the worldwide increase in productivity. 
Shortages of cropland, water erosion, and high oil prices 
are no longer insurmountable obstacles to countries 
seeking to develop their farm sectors. The worldwide 
adoption of technological advances, education, and capital 
lilYestment increased farm output by 25 percent between 
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1972 and 1982. In Third World countries, farm outp t 
rose 33 percent, compared with 18 percent in develop~ 
countries where farm surpluses persist (Hushak, 1987) 
U.S. farmers now face stiff competition from forei~ 
producers who have made gains in competitive advantag 
through lower costs of production. e 
Government subsidies of foreign farm sectors have 
diminished the U.S. farmer's competitiveness also. For 
years the United States exported far more than it 
imported. In the 1970s, the U.S. farm sector was the 
principal contributor to the U.S. trade surplus. Although 
about 30 percent of the country's farm output is still 
sold abroad, the United States had an agricultural trade 
deficit last year for several months. Foreign producers , 
particularly countries of the European Economic 
Community (especially Great Britian and France) gained 
competitive advantage with farm export subsidies. These 
subsidies permitted them to become net exporters rather 
than net importers of grain. This policy reduces the 
competitiveness of U.S. farmers in world markets and 
has spawned protectionist trade sentiments in the United 
States. 
Another factor that diminishes the ability of farmers 
to sell their products is the decline in population growth. 
Despite the fact that Third World countries, comprising 
7S percent of the world's population, have yet to enter 
the high-demand phase for farm products, the decline in 
the rates of population growth in the United States and 
worldwide has reduced the potential growth in demand 
for food (Nebraska Department of Economic 
Development, 1987). Both of these rates peaked in the 
1960s. Moreover, as incomes increase worldwide, the 
percentage of income spent on food declines and reduces 
the growth in demand for farm products. 
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Still another factor that diminishes the competi-
-veness of U.S. farmers is the drive for self-
tlufficiency. Distrust drives importing countries to 
~ecome self-sufficient, particularly in food production. 
And, recent actions by the United States have encouraged 
countries to become self-sufficient, regardless of the 
comparative advantage. As explained earlier, macro-
economic policy induced instability in the U.S economy 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s inflated the value 
of the dollar. The increase was so dramatic that it 
signaled foreign buyers that U.S. farm products may not 
always be available at reasonable prices. Rather than be 
vulnerable to changes in the economic policies of the 
United States and other exporting countries, importing 
countries have been encouraged to become self-sufficient 
in agriculture. 
Further, the United States has shown that it will not 
sell food to countries with whom it disagrees politically. 
The most recent example is the embargo on grain sales 
to Russia in 1980. The messages conveyed by this action 
were that the United States is an unreliable supplier and 
that political and economic freedom require self-
sufficiency. 
Finally, protectionist trade policies inhibit growth in 
farm export demand. When foreigners initiate such 
policies, U.S. farm products become relatively more 
expensive, and when the United States initiates such 
policies, foreigners tend to retaliate with protectionist 
policies of their own. Protectionism prevents gains in 
trade and further encourages self-sufficiency. 
Because of increased productivity and little growth in 
world demand, market prices of U.S. farm products may 
fall so much that many farmers will not be able to 
continue farming. In fact, this has happened. 
Overproduction of farm products in the United States, 
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created by government price supports set above mark 
prices, will persist under current U.S. farm policy. ;t 
these supports are reduced, farmers with higher u ,s 
costs will have to reduce these costs or go out : 
business. 
In the 1920s, there were 130,000 farms and ranche 
in Nebraska. Through consolidation, induced by increase~ 
productivity, the number is presently 58,000 (U.S 
Department of Agriculture, 1985). Genetic engineeri~ 
and other scientific advantages will continue to increase 
farm output, and thereby reduce the resources needed to 
produce farm output. By the year 2000, half of 
Nebraska's current productive capacity is expected to be 
superfluous (Nebraska Department of Economic 
Development, 1987). 
Current Outlook for the Macroeconomic Environment 
Nebraska's farm sector is strongly influenced by 
changes in its macroeconomic environment. U.S. macro-
economic policy changes that environment. Therefore, the 
current stance and direction of U.S. policy is important 
in addressing Nebraska's farm problems. 
The current objective of U.S. macroeconomic policy 
is expected to continue. Monetary and fiscal policy will 
be coordinated to promote economic growth while 
maintaining macroeconomic stability. That is, policy will 
be used to promote secular or long-term growth while 
minimizing cyclical activity around the long-term grow~ 
path of the economy. 
U.S. monetary policy will be used to provide 
sufficient spending power to accommodate gains ir 
productivity on the supply side of the economy. Monetan 
restraint will be used to hold down inflation and stabiliZi. 
nominal interest rates. In the spirit of the Gramm' 
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Rudman-Hollings Bill, fiscal policy will be geared 
toward reduction of the federal budget deficit, and 
thereby, help to hold down nominal interest rates. 
Farm policy is moving slowly in the direction of 
reducing price supports of farm products and letting 
rnarkets again provide accurate signals about what to 
produce, who should produce it, and how much to 
produce. Considerable discussion continues in an effort to 
change the basis for current farm support payments. 
Basing support on the amount produced encourages 
overproduction, which is a principal part of the current 
: farm problem. 
Although the United States continues to flirt with 
protectionism, international trade policy is likely to 
,continue to promote free trade, that is, trade based on 
the comparative advantage criterion. Japan's reluctance to 
open its markets to U.S. products and the European 
Economic Community's dumping of government subsidized 
farm products are major targets of U.S. trade policy. 
Also, efforts will continue to get other countries to 
stimulate their growth so they can buy more U.S. 
exports. In addition, U.S. trade policy will continue to be 
5eared toward international cooperation to stabilize 
exchange rates. Thus, they will reflect changes in 
relative growth of productivity (or comparative costs) 
Jetween countries and not the relative abilities of 
:ountries to manipulate exchange rates to their 
,ompetitive advantage through unfair practices. Hopefully, 
:he 1970s and 1980s have taught us that exchange rate 
stability is important in developing and maintaining 
sustained growth in export markets. 
Based on current macroeconomic policy, the short-
rm outlook for U.S. agriculture is healthier than it has 
,Jeen for some time. Stability is the principal policy 
lbjective, with emphasis on short-term stability (to 
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minimize the severity ~f cyclical swings) and. sustainable 
secular growth. GIven the current dIrection f 
macroeconomic policy, government and private forecas~ 
predict that the United States will experience modest, bu~ 
steady and sustained, growth in output into the 1990s 
The Congressional Budget Office expects real gros' 
national product (GNP) to grow between 2.5 and 3.~ 
percent per year through 1992 (Congressional BUdget 
Office, 1987). The major source of economic growth 
other than increases in private sector consumption, i~ 
expected to be an increase in net exports (exports less 
imports). Exports are expected to rise and imports fall. 
Although unemployment is expected to fall from 7 percent 
in 1986, to about 6 percent by 1992, real interest rates 
are expected to fall as nominal rates decline slightly 
(long-term rates more than short-term rates). The 
inflation rate is expected to increase from 1.9 percent in 
1986, to about 4.3 percent by 1992, and lower real 
interest rates are expected to reduce further (although 
not dramatically) the value of the U.S. dollar. 
Lower real interest rates will improve supply and 
demand conditions in agricultural markets for U.S. 
farmers. But, the overall outlook for U.S farmers, 
particularly those in Nebraska, is not very bright. 
Federal government support at current levels is unlikely 
and, at best, unreliable. Although the debt problem is 
being solved through repayment, restructuring, and 
bank ruptcy, as stated earlier, Nebraska will probably 
have to reduce resources in agriculture because of 
worldwide overproduction. 
Policy Choices 
Nebraska farmers, like others associated with U.S. 
agriculture, react mostly to changes in domestic and 
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'nternational markets. They cannot control these changes, 
~ut they can attempt to influence policy initiatives by the 
federal government. Recent events and the current 
economic outlook suggest several choices for Nebraska's 
support of federal government policy. 
State Support for Federal Policies 
First, Nebraska can support policies that promote 
fair trade. When trade is fair, competitiveness is 
determined solely on the basis of comparative advantage. 
The lower Nebraska's farmers can get their costs 
through increased productivity, the more competitive they 
will become. Unfair trade occurs when U.S. or foreign 
farmers gain a competitive advantage in world markets 
through means other than decreases in comparative costs 
(for example, government subsidies, price supports, or 
favorable macroeconomic policies). These factors distort 
exchange rates and obscure relative costs of production 
and exchange between trading partners. Lowering 
production costs and adopting international trade policies 
that are designed to neutralize, if not eliminate, unfair 
trade practices are necessary for sustaining 
competitiveness in world markets. 
Second, Nebraska can support macroeconomic 
policies that promote and maintain a stable domestic and 
international environment for production and exchange. 
Stability reduces the uncertainty associated with various 
types of production, such as agriculture, in which there 
are substantial lags between beginning and finishing 
production and exchange. The boom and bust years of the 
1970s and 1980s are a classic example of macroeconomic 
POlicy-induced instability. First low, then high, and then 
low real interest rates and exchange rates contributed to 
the serious problems of farmers with debt and 
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overproduction. Policy designed to 
instability provides a more certain 
environment for farm management. 
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reduce CYClical 
and less costly 
Third, Nebraska can support efforts of the Federal 
Reserve Board and the federal government to promote 
international cooperation for maintaining a stable 
international environment. Along with exchange rate 
stability, it is important for U.S. trading partners to 
stimulate their economies so that they can buy more U.S. 
farm products. Recently, the United States made some 
progress in this area. Trading partners have pledged to 
stimulate their economies if the United States will hold 
down real interest rates by reducing the federal deficit. 
Another issue of concern is the Third World's debt 
problem. Unfortunately, another casualty of the 1970s and 
1980s cycle was the Third World market for U.S. farm 
products. These countries borrowed heavily to expand 
their economies and now they use many of their U.S. 
dollars to service debts rather than to buy U.S. products. 
Further debt restructuring through international 
cooperation could substantially improve export demand for 
U.S. farm products. 
Fourth, farm policy must be restructured. Nebraska 
can support Congress in efforts to phase out farm price 
supports. Current price supports reduce the 
competitiveness of U.S. farmers in world markets and 
encourage overproduction. The heart of the problem with 
overproduction is that price supports keep relatively 
high-cost farmers in business. This means that high-cost 
farmers gain at the expense of their lower cost 
competitors. Of course, it is the taxpayers and 
consumers who pay for all this. Government payments 
may be warranted while phasing out expensive and 
counterproductive price supports. But, the humanitarian 
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pOlicy of providing government support for farmers need 
not encourage overproduction. 
In addition to supporting the federal government 
pOlicies suggested above, Nebraska can take some direct 
stepS to improve its ability to compete. 
State Policies to Support Agricultural Competitiveness 
First, Nebraska can support and conduct research to 
evaluate its areas of actual and potential comparative 
advantage. No adequate study has been conducted to 
determine the products for which the United States has a 
comparative advantage. No such study has been 
undertaken at the state level either. In a world which is 
becoming increasingly global and market sensitive, more 
research is essential. 
Second, Nebraska can adapt more quickly to larger 
scale farm production. Increased productivity (which 
decreases unit costs) through large-scale production is a 
worldwide reality and no amount of state legislation, 
such as Nebraska's Initiative 300, is going to help small-
scale farmers survive in world markets. Initiative 300 
continues to inhibit Nebraska's efforts to regain its 
competitive edge in world agricultural markets. 
Third, identifying the products in which Nebraska's 
farmers enjoy a comparative advantage and moving to 
large-scale production is unlikely to justify retaining 
current resources in farm production. As mentioned 
earlier, it is expected that Nebraska will have to reduce 
the amount of land in agriculture by about half during 
this century. This is expected to help Nebraska catch up 
with the deagriculturalization of its economy. This 
process has been occurring nationally, and to a lesser 
extent in the state, for the past 100 years. Of course, 
deagriculturalization must be accompanied by efforts to 
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develop new sources of income. Futhermore, th 
adjustment from farm to nonfarm employment Wil~ 
require additional policy initiatives at the state level. 
Fourth, Nebraska can initiate measures at the state 
level (and cooperate at the national level) and thus 
provide a better marketing strategy for its farm 
products in world markets. Efforts must be made at the 
commodity level with buyers in specific countries where 
it is likely that state officials would be more effective 
negotiators. Clearly, in an increasingly competitive world 
the ability of Nebraska's farmers to recapture and 
expand domestic and international markets will depend on 
how aggressively the markets are pursued. In order to 
survive, Nebraska's farmers must become more 
entrepreneurial in the production and marketing of their 
products. 
Conclusions 
Nebraska's farm problem is both cyclical and 
secular. The macroeconomic policy of the 1970s and 
1980s caused a cyclical decline in the competitiveness of 
farmers in world agricultural markets. Since the early 
1980s, the United States has pursued a general policy of 
restoring macroeconomic stability. Recovery from the 
cyclical downturn in agriculture is not expected to 
restore sales of farm products to their peak levels of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Clearly, preoccupation with cyclical 
activity has obscured the underlying secular problem of 
the farm sector. 
Substantial increases in productivity, due primarily to 
technological advances and modest growth in demand, 
mean lower farm prices and the withdrawal of 
resources from production. However, government price 
supports and other forms of protectionism have resulted 
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in the overproduction of farm products. In the absence of 
trade based on comparative advantage, the world has no 
waY of determining how much food to produce and who 
should produce it so that resources are not wasted. 
Government price supports obscure accurate market 
information about possible gains in trade for farmers, 
and taxpayers are often forced to buy with their tax 
dollars what they refused to buy as consumers. This 
state of affairs makes no economic sense. The policy 
choices presented above may contribute to providing a 
more rational approach to addressing the problems of 
agriculture. 
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